Fundamental rights and migration of judicial models in the conditionality of investment treaties and transnational public policies. The cambodian case by Paffarini, Jacopo
33Revista Brasileira de Direito, 10(1): 33-47, 2014 - ISSN 2238-0604
Fundamental Rights and Migration  
of Judicial Models in the Conditionality  
of Investment Treaties and Transnational  
Public Policies. The Cambodian case
Jacopo Paffarini
Doutor em Direito Público pela Università degli Studi di Perugia (Itália). Mestre em Direito com a colaboração 
do Centro Tecnológico de Monterrey (Campus Ciudad de México). Bacharel em Direito pela Università degli 
Studi di Perugia. Pesquisador Visitante do Instituto Max-Planck de Direito Público Comparado - Heidelberg 
(Alemanha). Membro pesquisador do Grupo Internacional de Pesquisa “Corte, Doutrina e Sociedade Inclusiva:  
o impacto das fontes doutrinárias nas Cortes Superiores”, financiado pelo Ministério de Instrução, das  
Universidades e Pesquisa (Decreto n. 719/2012). Colaborador assistente na Cátedra de Direito Constitucional  
e Direito Público Comparado, de titularidade do Prof. Dr. Maurizio Oliviero, junto ao Curso de Direito da  
Università degli Studi di Perugia. Coorientador do módulo de Direito Transnacional no curso de Direito  
Público Comparado. Participante do Projeto de Lei Transnacional na London Law School of  
Economics (Inglaterra). Tem experiência na área de Direito, com ênfase em Direito Público,  
atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: direito transnacional, constitucionalismo,  
direitos humanos, hermenêutica do direito e instituições judiciais.
Abstract
Justice Reform in developing countries is one of the most important priorities of international eco-
nomic organizations. Reform is frequently pursued by setting up new institutions beyond national 
authorities, in order to prevent national government interference with their functions. The theories 
linking economic growth and rule of law models offer legitimization to the legal transplants required 
to meet international standards. The Cambodian case shows that this connection is often unbalanced 
and the regulation of the new models seeks productive increase rather than better justice in the field 
of fundamental rights.
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1. A Transnational Perspective 
on the Study of Imitation Cases
The development of interaction dynamics 
between state legal systems – and between those 
and the normative standards settled by interna-
tional organizations – is a common field of study 
for jurists of different legal branches. However, 
beyond the traditional collection of “assonance 
cases” between different legal orders, it seems 
opportune that the legal scientists concentrate 
their survey also on the directions acquired by 
the migration of legal ideas. 
By the end of last century, comparative stu-
dies highlighted a significant increase in the re-
ception cases of Western legal models by the re-
maining areas of the world1. Among developing 
1 For a critical approach to the subject, see U. 
MATTEI, L. NADER, Il saccheggio. Regime di le-
galità e trasformazioni globali, Milano-Torino, 2010.
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countries the majority of the imitation of Wes-
tern normative solutions have been grounded on 
the conditionality2 imposed by the developed na-
tions – on the commercial treaties – and by the 
international organizations – on the cooperation 
and development programs – rather than on the 
“prestige” of those models.
The itinerary of research that is going to 
be illustrated on the following pages assumes 
as reference point the promotion of arbitration 
through justice reform transnational policies ad-
dressed to the developing countries, especially by 
considering labor rights. The following exposure 
technique reflects a specific choice to distinguish 
the analysis of the causes that have stimulated to 
the migration of ADR models and the results oc-
curred in recipient countries legal systems.
The case-study selected for this purpose is 
the experience of international cooperation that 
established the Arbitration Council of the United 
Kingdom of Cambodia, to which the jurisdiction 
on workers’ fundamental rights and liberties has 
been progressively conferred. Initially, the arti-
cle will focus on the two most significate aspects 
by the comparative point of view: on one hand, 
the link between the dynamics of finance and 
2 Since 1952, the principle of conditionality has 
been implicitly introduced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) triennial grant policies 
to force the beneficiary states to adopt a specific 
balance approach, characterized by a restrictive 
orientation on public spending. The practice of 
financial conditionality has known a growing 
legitimation and diffusion among the lending 
policies due above all to its convergence function 
between the objectives of contracting parties: the 
beneficiary interest in obtaining the lending is 
bound to the implementation of the politics that 
the borrower considers more appropriate to ensu-
re production growth and, with this, the success-
ful conclusion of the relation with the restitution 
of the amount agreed, see M. GUITIAN, Fund 
Conditionality Evolution of Principles and Prac-
tices, Washington, 1981, pp.10-14; F.O. ANOUBI, 
The Implications of Conditionality. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and Africa, Lanham-New 
York, 1992, p. 160-161. After its extension to bi-
lateral and multilateral archetype of non-lend-
ing agreements, the practice of conditionality 
was formalized by art. 60 of Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which states that 
“the violation of a provision essential to the ac-
complishment or object or purpose of the trea-
ty” represents a “material breach” that authorizes 
the parties to “terminate the treaty or suspend-
ing its operation in whole or in part”. Not every 
infringement authorized the suspension of rela-
tionships, but only those that interest the essen-
tial clauses identified by the parties or identifiable 
through the interpretation of the provisions. 
international trade and the spread of rule of law 
institutes; on the other hand, the role of interna-
tional organizations in the monitoring transplant 
process and the provision of “technical supply” to 
lead the legal model toward the predefined func-
tion. The second part of the analysis will focus 
on some statistical data concerning the activity 
of the Arbitration Council, by comparing them 
with the original targets of the Labour Dispute 
Resolution Project that started and sustained the 
institution-building experience.
Through the study of this experience is in-
tended to emphasize the double-effect related to 
the progressive reception of ADR models by the 
developing nations legal orders. On one hand, the 
increasing number of cases connected with arbi-
tral procedure transplants determines the dispo-
sal of “individualizing” and “specifying” charac-
ters of arbitral function, by maturing a growing 
focus on the matters of legal and hermeneutic 
consistency in the decision-making process. On 
the other hand, by the effects of those advance-
ments, the arbitral function has been incorpora-
ted inside a path for the construction transnatio-
nal judicial models inspired to the Western Rule 
of Law Tradition.
Before proceeding with the illustration of 
facts, here it is important to point out that in the 
following pages the legal experience is considered 
as a part of a (more complex) system for the pro-
duction of an historically-predetermined model 
of social life. For that purpose, to avoid ambiguity 
and clarify the consequences of that theoretic 
approach, it is preferable to study the circulation 
of legal models in the specific point of view of the 
development cooperation promoted by the inter-
national organizations as main actors of the on-
going globalizing process. From this perspective 
the concept of law dismiss the usual neutral sense 
– on the basis of which it comes as a mechanism 
for the regulation of the social life – while emer-
ges its function as an instrument for the domina-
tion of the multiplicity of reality available to an 
historically predetermined political power3.
3  See, N. IRTI, L’ordine giuridico del mercato, 
Roma-Bari, 2003, p. 8-10.
35Revista Brasileira de Direito, 10(1): 33-47, 2014 - ISSN 2238-0604
2. The Principle of Conditio-
nality: from Financial  
Balances to Cultural  
Hegemony
The connection between the circulation of 
Western legal models and international com-
merce ties in a considerable way since the second 
post-war. During this historical conjunction, the 
regulation of economic relationships is subject 
of two opposite tendencies that simultaneously 
involve the state legal orders. On the one hand, 
as an answer to the Great Depression and in the 
wake of the Keynesian theories that represented 
the Western answer to that crisis, the constitu-
tional law of European States restricted private 
liberty and added social previsions and so beca-
me the main stronghold for working class issues. 
On the other, immediately after the end of the 
conflict, a process of constitution of multilateral 
organizations started in order to offer legitimacy 
to the new international commerce and financial 
rules defined by winner States.
The increasing removal of obstacles to the 
full development of economic liberties beyond 
states boundaries – considered necessary for 
better working conditions4 – associate the sta-
tutory objectives of some of the most important 
institutions born in the early postwar: the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the General Agreement on Trade and Ser-
vices (GATT) and, last, the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
By the way of those supranational bodies, 
the industrialized countries have sought the 
construction of a uniform commercial law that 
has increasingly claimed its autonomy from the 
national political powers and generally the other 
“places intended for political and social negotia-
tion where all the previsions of law take form”5.
4  See, for example, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Articles of 
Agreement (1944), which, in Article 1, aims “to 
promote the long-range balanced growth of in-
ternational trade and the maintenance of equi-
librium in balances of payments by encouraging 
international investment for the development of 
the productive resources of members, thereby as-
sisting in raising productivity, the standard of li-
ving and conditions of labor in their territories”.
5  See, F. GALGANO, Lex mercatoria, Bologna, 
2011, p. 12. This article shares the Authors point 
of view for which the “legal particularism” of 
The law of the “transnational merchant class” 
– commonly denominated, in a more neutral ter-
ms, “societas mercatorum” or “business commu-
nity” – today seems furnished of all the elements 
to be a proper legal order: a plurality of legal sub-
jects (represented by the business corporations 
operating in the global market), a set of rules 
(embodied by generally recognized commercial 
uses), a justice system (composed by the network 
of international arbitration chambers)6.
In historical terms, the route of this progres-
sion starts with the end of the utopia of giving 
birth to an “international government of eco-
nomy” that was the purpose of certain delegates 
to the Bretton Woods Conference7. The attempt 
to distinguish the global regulation of exchanges 
from the geopolitical interests of industrialized 
states is evident in the statutory previsions which 
forbid to IBRD and IMF to interfere with mem-
ber states political affairs8. For these reasons, the 
grant suspension is admitted only for purposes 
concerning the success of the financial program 
and never for political or other non-economic 
considerations9.
commercial law is based both on the rule-ma-
king technique and on the limits of the area of 
human relationships covered by those rules. On 
the first side, the medieval and contemporary 
history of lex mercatoria testify to the continued 
ambition of commercial law to reach its auto-
nomy from civil law “in order to be more rapidly 
and more easily amended, in correspondence to 
the changing needs of exchanges and to be a law, 
the most possible, a-national, in antithesis to the 
markedly national characterization of civil law”, 
Ivi, p. 10. Respecting to the limits of commer-
cial law, what in doctrine is commonly called 
“commercial law” effectively regulate neither 
the whole, nor only commerce (Ivi, p.11). One the 
most important examples of this characteristic 
is the increasing number of relationships – and 
so, the subjective rights – ruled by contract sta-
tements or through procedures – such as arbi-
tration – deriving from them. 
6  See, F. GALGANO, cit.. p. 248-9.
7  See, S. VEZZANI, Gli accordi delle Organizzazio-
ni del Gruppo Banca Mondiale, Torino, 2011, p. 
250-251. As the Author observes, the Yalta nego-
tiations did not prevent the US State Department 
threatening in 1947 a veto on the French grant 
if the communist representatives wouldn’t be 
all expelled from government offices. A similar 
policy was adopted toward the Latin American 
counties during the seventies and the eighties of 
the last century when, for example, the lending 
to Chile was interrupted during the Allende Pre-
sidency (1971-1973) and then was re-established 
when Pinochet formed a new government.
8  Art. IV, sec. 10 of the Statute of International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
9  Art. III, sec. 5, lett. B), of the Statute of Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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Once acknowledged the impossibility of a 
conciliation between the two contending block 
positions and that a common project of interna-
tional development was impracticable, the role 
of IMF and IBRD economic conditionality was 
essential for the spread of the liberal-economics 
ideology, which has given birth to the present lex 
mercatoria. The Bretton Woods conditionality, 
indeed, has never limited itself to the financial 
profiles of the lending operation, but has imme-
diately shown its “expansive character” by stimu-
lating the addition onto the agreements of clauses 
without an immediately-productive scope10. The 
development path of standby arrangements of 
IMF represents good evidence of this tendency. 
The original version of this type of agreement 
found its scope in postwar-reconstruction len-
ding to benefit of the most affected states which, 
in exchange, assumed the commitment to reform 
specific institutes concerning the regulation of 
commerce. The development target was asso-
ciated, in particular, with the elimination of the 
existing limits to the freedom to conduct a busi-
ness and external exchanges, to the institution of 
an internal market founded on the principles of 
competition with the removal of all the assistance 
measures for the national industry. The norma-
tive content of standby arrangements, moreover, 
became more complex in the seventies, when the 
consequences of the oil crisis on the balance of 
payments increased the member states’ pressu-
re for more cash to the International Monetary 
Fund. More specifically, an extension of the term 
of the financial assistance program was granted 
(from one to five years) linked to more restrictive 
requests on “aggregate demand” policies. Conse-
quently, those imbalances had been, not only the 
economic, but also the political basis for cutting 
the state services’ budget.11
10  See, S. VEZZANI, op.cit., p. 247-8. A turning-
-point in the policies on conditionality is identi-
fied by the author in the interior memorandum 
drawn up by the General Counsellor in 1984, 
which states that “the currently entertained con-
ception of the term “project” with its engineering 
undertones unduly introduces a measure of rigid-
ity which cannot be supported by the definition in 
the standard dictionaries of the Bank’s Articles”, 
see, Project and Non-Project Financing under the 
IBRD Articles, Legal Memorandum by the Gen-
eral Counsel, I.F.I. SHIHATA, The World Bank 
Legal Papers, L’Aia, 2000, p. 173-183.
11  See, F.O. ANOUBI, The Implications of Condi-
tionality, cit., p. 162. The economic theories af-
filiated to the IMF lending policies have always 
declared the existence of a implied link between 
the excess of goods demand, inflation and desta-
In the aftermath of Soviet disaggregation, 
there was an increase of developing countries 
adhesions to the World Bank and IMF coopera-
tion programs, of which the Western states are 
the main donors and promoters. The primary 
objective pursued by global institutions in this 
historical context is the adjustment of the East 
Europe and Asiatic economies which have quit 
the state-planning experience. Usually, the role 
played by the law in global market construction 
and investment made by Western States in the ex-
portation of their legal models is not adequately 
acknowledged. From those considerations is pos-
sible to assert that the adaptation of the national 
“legal infrastructure” of any country to the world 
competition – from the promotion and imple-
mentation of private autonomy to the certainty 
of impartial dispute resolution procedure – does 
not starts “free” or “spontaneous”, but is imposed 
as a requirement to be part of the international 
exchanges supported by global institutions12.
However, there is another totally original 
aspect that has arisen since the end of the last 
century, it is the acceptance of the theory asser-
ting a connection between economic develop-
ment and the constitutional principles promoted 
by liberalism. Under this influence, the content 
of conditionality is increasingly moving from 
the traditional area of commercial and financial 
law to the main representative aspects of the rela-
tionship between public authority and citizens13. 
bilization of the states’ balance of payments. On 
this belief have found an explanation the usual 
requests of cuts on public spending (especially, 
those related to the medical assistance) that have 
been advanced in exchange for the subsidized 
rates grant by the Fund.
 When the standby arrangements have a long-
term duration, the lending conditions are stated 
in a “Letter of Intent” drawn up by the IMF rep-
resentatives and subscribed by the Minister of 
Economy of the beneficiary state. After a long pe-
riod of absence from the international scene, this 
typology of agreements have found a new life in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which 
has brought many IMF member states to make 
further demand on the assistance programmes.
12  See, U. MATTEI, L. NADER, Il saccheggio. Re-
gime di legalità e trasformazioni globali, Milano-
Torino, 2010, p. 13. The Authors point out the 
different ways of legal models migration: apart 
from military domination or the “prestige” of a 
normative institute, can be traced another way, 
the “conditional imposition”. This expression 
means that “the acceptance of a system of rules 
is not totally free. The interested countries are 
persuaded to adopt the legal structures which 
meet Western standards if they do not want to 
be excluded from the international market”. 
13  The global institutions policies try to synchro-
nize economic development and legal system 
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For that reasons, at the start of the new millen-
nium the states accession to the main organiza-
tions of international commerce and finance is 
subject to the acceptance of specific standards of 
human rights protection14. This implies two very 
important consequences. First, the trade organi-
zations can express their rating both on the level 
of economic liberty and the efficiency of natio-
nal legal systems. Second, the States that aim to 
enter the system of international relations ruled 
by World Trade Organization and International 
Monetary Fund shall reform their normative and 
institutional framework in order to match the le-
gal models recommended by the latter. Reflecting 
on this process, legal science has introduced the 
notion of “political conditionality” to indicate the 
set of principles and norms – derived from custo-
mary international law (jus cogens) and the main 
international bodies’ soft law – which shape the 
legal category of “human rights”, “democracy” 
and “good governance”15 
3. Justice Reform in Deve-
loping Countries: Legal 
Transplants meet a Pro-
blem-Solving Approach
The intervention of the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) in the industrial dyna-
mics of Cambodia is not an isolated event, but it 
reforms: as is possible to read in the Word Bank 
Development Report, of 1999 “Without the pro-
tection of human and property rights, and a 
comprehensive framework of laws, no equitab-
le development is possible”. Available at: http://
web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/
WEB/0__CO-87.HTM
14  See, M.R. FERRARESE, Il diritto al presente. 
Globalizzazione e tempo delle istituzioni, Bologna, 
2002, p. 116.
15  See, P. UVIN, I. BIAGIOTTI, Global Gover-
nance and the “New” Political Conditionality, in 
Global Governance, 2 (1996), p. 377: “Yet political 
conditionality may also be more broadly defined 
as a set of specific state behaviors – respecting 
human rights, organizing multiparty elections, 
working in a good governance mode, and cut-
ting military spending – that are internationally 
upheld as conducive to development and whose 
realization is promoted, inter alia, through that 
leverage instrument. The specific state behaviors 
that are promoted may be said to constitute a re-
gime: sets of internationally dominant principles 
and norms around which expectations converge 
and that define acceptable state behavior for both 
recipient and donor countries”.
is a part of wider justice reform strategy started 
in the beginning of the new millennium by the 
common and coordinated action of the major in-
ternational organizations16. Recently World Bank 
“activism” in financial and technical support of 
judicial transplants has conferred a preeminence 
to the theoretical approaches that pose the effec-
tiveness of rights at the center of economic gro-
wth programs17.
The emergence of this trend is a reflection of 
a clear strategy prepared by the law offices of these 
organizations, who are asked to make an assess-
ment of the impact of the law (public and private) 
on the economic performance. The results obtai-
ned are the basis for elaboration of the reforms 
required to initiate or continue a loan. Although 
the content of the agreements may therefore vary 
depending on the characteristics (political, social 
and legal) of the recipient country, the conditio-
nality of the World Bank and the IMF follows 
consistent criteria that give to the support activity 
a certain uniformity in the results.
An overall view of soft law produced by the 
World Bank on the issue, the “New Directions on 
Justice Reform” is the document that summarizes 
best the “modus operandi” of international orga-
16  In the nineties a decisive turning point occur-
red in the lending policies of the World Bank 
and IMF. It is a moment of general exaltation of 
the models of liberal constitutionalism – of whi-
ch is celebrated the rational superiority to the 
principles of “socialist legality”. For the financial 
institutions it is an opportunity to reaffirm the 
link between economic growth and the rule of 
law, and open a way for reconsider the prohibi-
tion of interference with the political affairs of 
the borrower states prescribed at Article IV, Sec. 
10, IBRD Articles of Agreement. This is confir-
med by the studies on the the progress made in 
carrying out the first eight projects for justice re-
form (1995-2007), commissioned by the World 
Bank itself: see, Justice Reform Projects in Latin 
America: Lessons Learned (1995-2010), Working 
Paper No. 70755, 2011, p. 7. 
17  Between 1994 and 2012 there were 36 the pro-
jects which aimed to support justice reforms, 
for an annual commitment of $24 million. 
To this figure must be added the presence in 
many investment projects (388, to be precise) 
of significant items of expenditure (on average, 
at least 10% of the total amount of the loan) 
dedicated to the issues of “law and justice” or 
the “rule of law”. See, New Directions on Jus-
tice Reform – A companion piece to the updated 
strategy and implementation plan on strength-
ening governance tackling corruption, Work-
ing Paper no. 70640, 2012, p.3-4, available on 
line: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/2012/05/16706679/world-bank-new-direc-
tions-justice-reform-companion-piece-updat-
ed-strategy-implementation-plan-strengthen-
ing-governance-tackling-corruption.
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nizations. In this publication, the Legal Vice Pre-
sidency explains in detail why the judicial system 
of a State carries out functions critical to econo-
mic growth, highlighting three different profiles. 
First, the proper functioning of justice is conside-
red necessary to prevent crimes and mitigate the 
level of conflict and violence in society, identified 
as the main barriers to development. Second, it 
attaches to the administrative and criminal juris-
diction a decisive role in the fight against corrup-
tion, theft of public property by the ruling elites in 
developing countries and, more generally, in the 
prosecution of crimes committed in the manage-
ment of the economy by the public authorities of 
the State. Finally, the judicial system is recognized 
as an essential function of “driving” the economy, 
to the extent that it ensures the growth of the pri-
vate sector in accordance with the framework tra-
ced by the political bodies of the country and the 
international bodies of the various business sec-
tors. Therefore the Legal Vice Presidency believes 
that the predictability of the legal effects of con-
tracts, the presence of legal protection of property 
rights and a system for resolving legal disputes are 
“key determinants of economic development”18.
The construction of a theoretical link bet-
ween the spread of the rule of law and economic 
growth has also directed studies of legal science. 
In fact, when the concept of “development” – it 
has been declined during the decennial activity 
of report and technical assistance of the World 
Bank – entered in the reflections of comparative 
doctrine the same classification of legal systems 
came out transformed. The traditional divisions 
are based mainly on the rule-making process 
(common law and civil law) or on the degree of 
influence of political, religious or cultural factors 
in the functioning of the legal system of the cou-
ntry (democratic state, socialist state, authorita-
rian state, theocratic state). However, there are 
long-established approaches to the comparison 
that tend to divide legal experiences according to 
their adherence to the principles of “good gover-
nance” and “good government” derived from in-
ternational humanitarian law and human rights 
theories19. It can be traced back to these assump-
18 See, New Directions on Justice Reform, cit., p.2.
19  See, V.C. JACKSON, Comparative Constitutio-
nal Law: Methodologies, in M. ROSENFELD, A. 
SAJÒ (edited by), The Oxford Handbook of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, Oxford, 2012, p. 55-
56 e 60. The Author warns about the possibility 
of considering this type of study as real “classi-
fiers”, even when the formal presentation is such. 
It would be appropriate to distinguish, therefo-
tions the distinction between developed and deve-
loping nations based on the presence or not of full 
legal infrastructure evolved and able to efficiently 
regulate private trade20. This division plays a par-
ticularly important role in terms of migration of 
legal models. Attempts to transplant have a grea-
ter legitimacy from legal doctrine when affecting 
the countries with a low level of development, but 
are generally not considered appropriate when the 
country “receiver” has an evolved legal system. 
Thus, for example, the “strengthening” of private 
autonomy – even through the regulation of con-
tractual legal relationships involving rights cons-
titutionally established or, more generally, matters 
of public law – is presented as one of the most ef-
fective remedies in respect of inefficiency of gover-
nment and public administration in developing 
countries21. In contrast, in a mature industrialized 
context, where administrative law and constitutio-
nal law have developed a proven system of protec-
tion of public interests, it is believed that a similar 
solution could question the predictability of the 
law and the very quality of regulation22. 
That said, the presence of a “dialogue” bet-
ween legal science and international institutions 
can be inferred from the detection of some key 
re, the case studies in which the real interest of 
the comparatist is the definition of constitutio-
nal models, rather than those in which the study 
of foreign law is aimed at the construction of a 
general theory capable of giving answers to the 
problems of contemporary democracies (such as 
the relationship between legality and equality, 
or between judicial review and democracy).
20  See, P.J. Mc CONNAUGAY, The Scope of Auton-
omy in International Contracts and Its Relation 
to Economic Regulation and Development, in 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 39, 
december 2000, p. 601. It is interesting to read 
the Author’s word: “This Article distinguish-
es “developed” from “developing” nations in a 
purely functional way. Developed nations are 
those nations that enjoy fully developed legal 
infrastructures and the ability to effectively reg-
ulate commercial activity-principally the major 
industrialized trading nations of the West, per-
haps along with the few most advanced indus-
trialized nations of Asia. Developing nations 
are those nations whose judicial and commer-
cial regulatory institutions lack the capacity to 
perform their prescribed or intended functions 
effectively, whether because the institutions do 
not exist, because they are under-developed, be-
cause they are under-funded, or because of some 
other disabling attribute, such as corruption”.
21 Ivi, p. 603.
22  “The risk of under-regulation occurs because, 
when a developed nation’s otherwise applicable 
public law is allowed to be displaced by private 
contractual election, the likelihood is that the 
contracting parties will elect a lesser or even in-
effective regulatory substitute”, Ivi, p. 602.
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determinants in the cooperation projects initia-
ted by the World Bank in the field of justice. First, 
it can be observed that “conditionality” has been 
directed mainly towards the newly industriali-
zed countries and has served to accomplish for 
the multiple actions of assistance and training 
personnel for the development of self-manage-
ment skills of disputes and judicial services23. The 
first “lesson” learned in the field by experts of the 
World Bank is that interventions to support refor-
ms cannot aim at the “rewriting” of the constitu-
tional principles of justice without taking account 
of the executive rules. The tendency is therefore to 
move from one action to support wide-ranging 
(“multi-faced approach”) to a cooperation to meet 
specific questions (“problem solving approach”). 
Therefore, most of the expenses incurred by the 
Bank (on average, two-thirds of the investments 
allocated for each project) are used in the cons-
truction of physical infrastructure (buildings and 
equipment for carrying material of the work of 
the courts) and logistics (information services 
and legal publishing, management tools)24.
The conditionality of loans from the Bank 
in recent years has therefore shown a predilection 
for empirical approach: it follows not only that 
the object of the cooperation projects is restric-
ted to specific questions (“the needs of end users”) 
emerged as a result of a “diagnosis” on the state 
of justice in the country, but also that the field of 
action is chosen by using “economic criteria”. As 
stated by the Legal Vice Presidency, the question 
is not how to reform the judicial system, but when 
and how the judicial system – with its inefficien-
cies – prevents proper development of the cou-
ntry25. Following this approach, the cooperative 
action of the Bank develops in three steps. The 
first phase aims to identify the regulatory area (for 
example, criminal law, copyright law, protection 
of vulnerable groups, etc..) on which it is inten-
ded to act and which must necessarily have some 
connection with economic growth to fall into the 
Bank “mandate”. In the following step is requi-
23  For a thorough review of the cooperation proj-
ects in the field of justice sponsored by the World 
Bank, see, R. LAVER, The World Bank and Ju-
dicial Reform: Overcoming “Blind Spots” in the 
Approach to “Judicial Independence”, in Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
Vol.22, 2012.
24  Ivi, p.199
25  “Rather than beginning with the question of 
how to modernize the court system, such efforts 
should begin by asking where failings of the justice 
system are constraint to equitable development”. 
See, New Directions on Justice Reform, cit., p. 9.
red that the processing of the reform proposals 
is specific enough to produce significant results 
in the actual conduct of the legal relationship. 
The program of cooperation must focus an is-
sue that represents a brake on economic growth 
of the country (for example, corruption or, as it 
has been for Cambodia, the high level of conflict 
in industrial relations) and propose an efficient 
solution. Finally, after an initial phase of imple-
mentation of the program, it is necessary to make 
an assessment of the impact of innovations – ac-
cording to the predetermined standards and cri-
teria – and provide the opportunity for the sector 
stakeholders (non-governmental organizations, 
local authorities, trade unions, etc..) to propose 
guidelines to amend the supporting actions26. 
Under this approach, focusing strongly on 
the themes of economic growth, there has been a 
decline in lending transactions with the sole ob-
jective of the development of judicial institutions 
in a country. The Bank’s intervention in this area, 
in fact, continued through investment projects 
in the private sector – especially in the manu-
facturing and agricultural industry of develo-
ping countries. As has already been highlighted 
above, most of these loan agreements contains 
components relating to the realization of specific 
judicial infrastructure in order to make possible 
the success of the investment. However, in many 
of these cases – as can be seen by simply reading 
cooperation projects – when those agreements 
talk about “justice”normally they do not refer to 
the national judiciary. The flight from the system 
of state institutions is justified in the light of the 
inadequacy and corruption of the ruling classes 
(including judicial): under the “umbrella” of a hu-
manitarian intervention, is favored the creation 
of new institutions from involvement of civil so-
ciety. In this way, on the one hand, it prevents the 
monetary aid granted from falling into the hands 
of the local governments and therefore diverted 
from purposes of cooperation projects, on the 
other hand, it try to remedy the lack of confiden-
ce of the population towards the courts.
The experience of the legal transplant which 
involved the field of industrial relations in Cam-
bodia, fully summarizes the features mentioned 
above, and anticipates some possible scenarios 
that may derive from the activity of cooperation as 
it has developed in that case. First of all, the epi-
sode highlights how the principle of conditionality 
26  Ibidem.
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works in trade agreements between industria-
lized and developing countries: it provides an 
example of how the economic interest becomes 
the engine of the processes of implementation 
of human rights and justice reform. Second, the 
definition of competences and the powers of the 
Arbitration Council testifies the character at the 
same time pragmatic (“problem-solving”) and 
consensual of the cooperation programs of inter-
national organizations. The effective performance 
of the functions of the AC is subject to acceptance 
by the parties, at first, of the jurisdiction (which is 
normal since it is an arbitration), subsequently, of 
the decision within eight days following its publi-
cation. Finally, the “Cambodian model”, unlike 
other attempts of transplant funded in previous 
experiences from the World Bank, had a conti-
nuity that has allowed it to enter into the social 
dynamics of Cambodia (where the textile indus-
try is the main source of economy and of employ-
ment for the population). This has contributed 
to the gradual transformation of the AC into a 
permanent organ of the judiciary in Cambodia, 
with powers to intervene in the conduct of col-
lective disputes, and basically “irresponsible” in 
relation to other powers of the Cambodian State 
(both executive and the judiciary). These will be 
the issues that will be dealt in the second part of 
our reflection.
4. The Circulation of Trade 
Union Rights through the 
Conditionality of Commer-
cial Treaties. The Launch 
of a “Reward Mechanism” 
in the US-Cambodia Textile 
Agreement
During the nineties the reduction of manu-
facturing costs became one of the most important 
challenges for the companies facing global trade 
competition. With the mass exodus of Western 
companies to the Asian sweatshops, however, 
public attention was focused on working condi-
tions in the textile sector in developing countries. 
Western companies were accused of supporting 
with their investments the dictatorships respon-
sible for the repression of trade union struggles 
in the factories of the countries in the developing 
world. Consequently, there has been a spread of 
the practice of linking the opening of trade ne-
gotiations to the willingness of partner country 
governments to engage in the protection of wor-
kers’ rights27. The first significant example of this 
tendency is the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (NAALC)28, a supplementary 
agreement to the treaty which regulates the com-
merce between the United States, Mexico and 
Canada from January 1, 1994 (North America 
Free Trade Agreement). The objective of NAALC 
is the promotion, “at the highest level possible”, 
of some of the fundamental trade union and wor-
ker rights identified in the text of the agreement 
itself29. The same formula was repeated in other 
bilateral agreements signed by the United States30 
and Canada31 with some countries in the develo-
ping world, as a result of internal pressures exer-
ted by the national unions, determined to put a 
stop to the relocation of production sites.
With the consolidation of a production sys-
tem structured on a global scale, the fight against 
so-called social dumping has become a prerogati-
ve of the common commercial policy of Western 
governments and multinational companies in the 
textile sector. On the initiative of the European 
Union and the United States new programs were 
created to encourage the adoption of minimum 
standards for the protection of labor in the de-
veloping world. Among the privileged tools in 
the pursuit of this objective, the Generalized 
27  The practice of including dispositions related to 
the promotion of working conditions in trade 
agreements does not remain isolated in the area 
of established democracies. As noted by S. PO-
LASKI, Protecting Labor Rights through Trade 
Agreements: an Analytical Guide, in Journal of 
International Law and Policy, July, 14, 2004, p. 
14: “Canada and Chile have also included la-
bor provisions in at least some of their bilateral 
trade agreements. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay 
and Paraguay have included labor commitments 
and institutions as part of the architecture of the 
Mercosur common market”. 
28  The text of the Agreement is available at:http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/naalc.pdf.
29  Art.1: “The objectives of the Agreement are to: 
[…]promote, to the maximum extent possible, the 
labor principles set out in Annex 1”.
30  U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement; U.S.-Sin-
gapore Free Trade Agreement; U.S.-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement
31  The Canada-Chile Agreement on Labor Coope-
ration is a supplementary agreement to the free 
trade treaty between the two countries having 
similar objectives to the NAALC.
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System of Preferences (GSP)32 – in derogation of 
the principles of free trade among nations pro-
moted by the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) – grants a reduced-tariff entran-
ce into the Western market to the products from 
countries that are committed to guaranteeing 
the internationally-recognized rights of workers. 
The program in question sees the industrialized 
countries adopting for the first time a common 
line of the limitations that should be imposed on 
competition in the name of the most basic hu-
man rights, such as freedom of association and 
to organize union activities or the prohibition of 
forced labor and child labor. It should be noted, 
however, that most of the expectations placed on 
the GSP have been circumvented and some have 
attributed the causes of this failure to the fact that 
the original objectives of the mechanism have 
subsequently been subordinated to the needs of 
economic and foreign policy of the United Sta-
tes33. From a legal perspective, the weak point of 
the GSP, as well as the majority of trade agree-
ments containing clauses relating to the promo-
tion of determining standards for protection of 
workers, is the lack of tools to ensure their effec-
tive implementation. The system of penalties nor-
mally used in international trade agreements is 
unfit to cover this task and, especially in cases in 
which it has been implemented, has been more 
detrimental to the populations of the developing 
countries – for which orders from the West are an 
important source of employment – than for the 
governments or the multinational corporations 
which were actually responsible for the breach of 
the obligations to protect34.
32  See, C. LANCE, J. VOGT, Labor Rights in the 
Generalized System of Preferences: A 20 Year Re-
view, in Comparative Labor Law and Policy Jour-
nal, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 2001, p.199-238.
33  See, D. WELLS, “Best Practice” in the regula-
tion of International Labor Standards: Lessons of 
the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, in Com-
parative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 27, 
2006, p. 359-360. For a similar consideration of 
the Generalized System of Preferences, see, K. 
ELLIOT, R. FREEMAN, Can Labor Standards 
improve under Globalization?, 2003, p. 87.
34  See, S. POLASKI, cit., p. 21: “A withdrawal of 
trade benefits could in some cases result in a di-
minuition of employment that would harm the 
workers (the victims of the original non-compli-
ance) as much or more than the employers (the 
perpetrators of labor law violations) and govern-
ment (which tolerated the violations)”. Similar 
remarks are made on the implementation of the 
provisions relating to the protection of workers 
in bilateral free trade agreements between the 
United States, on the one hand, Chile and Singa-
The dysfunctions of the GSP demonstrate 
the failure of the modern system of internatio-
nal relations to give an adequate response to the 
challenges posed by globalization of markets. 
First, in most of the experiences the cooperation 
relationship is non-existent because the imple-
mentation of the agreement depends almost ex-
clusively on local institutions. A second problem 
can be traced to the limitations – in the name of 
the national sovereignty – of the commitment to 
protect labor rights according to national, rather 
than international standards. 
The Cambodian case, although dating from 
the same period as the GSP, represents an excep-
tion. Firstly, because for the first time a “reward 
mechanism” was introduced consisting in the 
increase of quotas of products intended to have 
access to the American market in the event of 
proven improvements in the implementation of 
the provisions of the national Labor Code35 and 
generally recognized international standards36. 
Secondly, the program provides for regular mo-
nitoring of the progress made in working condi-
tions and the effective enjoyment of trade union 
freedoms. It is carried out on an annual basis 
directly in the factories and, above all, it is not 
carried out by the parties to the agreement, but 
by the staff of International Labor Organization 
(ILO). Finally, the increase in export quotas is 
granted in the case of a positive performance of 
the entire manufacturing sector. Therefore, failu-
re to adapt by one or more employers endangers 
the recognition of the trade benefits for the en-
tire industry. The latter aspect activates a “hori-
zontal mechanism of pressure” (from the wor-
kers and compliant companies to non-compliant 
ones) that has guaranteed, under the terms of the 
agreement, a general implementation of national 
pore, on the other by D. WELLS,.cit., p. 358: “In 
neither agreement is there is a process to enforce 
even the weak obligation that the countries take 
steps to comply with the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) fundamental (or core) in-
ternational labor rights”.
35  Art. 10, lett. A) “The Parties seek to [...]promote 
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, ex-
isting labour law, and promote the general labor 
rights embodied in the Cambodian labor code”. 
The commercial agreement is available at: http://
cambodia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/M9r-
zdrzMKGi6Ajf0SIuJRA/uskh_texttile.pdf 
36  Art. 10, lett. B): “The Royal Government of Cam-
bodia shall support the implementation of a pro-
gram to improve working conditions in the textile 
and apparel sector, including internationally rec-
ognized core labour standards, through the appli-
cation of Cambodian labor law”.
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and international provisions on workers’ protec-
tion without the need for coercive intervention by 
state institutions37.
Furthermore, as an implementation of the 
provisions of art. 10 of the Trade Agreement, 
there are two distinct programs of cooperation 
undertaken under the direction and control of 
the ILO: the Garment Sector Working Conditions 
Improvement Project and the Labor Dispute Reso-
lution Project. The first38 promotes a training pro-
gram aimed at educating workers and employers 
in trade union activities in an attempt to channel 
towards legal practice social conflict that often 
resulted in murders and attacks against activists. 
The second program, however, has given rise to 
the legally more significant aspect of this coope-
ration: the creation of a permanent arbitration 
tribunal, independent of other Cambodian insti-
tutions, and with functions of judgment in mat-
ters of trade union rights and collective disputes. 
The Arbitration Council (AC) was set up in May 
2003 and then, after some fundamental modifi-
cations, it was re-established in December 2005.
37  The connection between the system of pre-
miums constituted by the increase in export 
quotas and the overall performance of the ma-
nufacturing sector is, according to keen ob-
servers, the “trump card” of the experience of 
trade between the United States and Cambo-
dia. See, S. POLASKI, cit., p. 22. For a deeper 
analysis of the export quotas experience see, J. 
A. HALL, The ILO’s Better Factories Cambo-
dia Program: A Viable Blueprint for Promoting 
International Labor Rights?, in Stanford Law 
and Policy Review, Vol.21, No.3, p. 427-460. It 
should be noted, finally, that in the first report 
prepared by the ILO, two years after the entry 
into force of the trade agreement, are recorded 
significant improvements in the enjoyment 
of trade union freedoms: see, First Synthesis 
Report on Working Conditions in Cambodia’s 
Garment Sector, November 2001, available 
on the ILO website http://betterfactories.or-
g/?p=3044. On the same page are available all 
the other following Reports. 
38  The Garment Sector Working Conditions Im-
provement Project, also known by the name of 
“Better Factories Cambodia”, is structured in 
training courses on the application of the labor 
law rules, addressed to employees. workers and 
other intermediate figures of the organizatio-
nal structure of the industry in Cambodia. The 
program also provides for the establishment of a 
Committee responsible for consulting on how to 
implement the legislation, as well as monitoring 
and evaluation of progress in adapting to inter-
national standards, the positive outcome of whi-
ch is subject to the issuance of the export license 
to the company.
5. A new “judge” for collec-
tive disputes: aims and apo-
rias of a “problem-solving” 
justice reform
The AC model is unique in the international 
scene as it combines the key features of arbitration 
– the derivation from an investment agreement 
and the voluntary nature of jurisdiction – with a 
series of elements borrowed from the tradition of 
Western models of justice – providing legal gua-
rantees for the independence of the components 
and the obligation to observe a consistent inter-
pretation. The combination of these aspects is un-
derstandable in light of the major issues, which 
the introduction of the AC has tried to resolve. 
The factual and legal context in which the 
project has been launched is, in fact, characteri-
zed by strong instability of social relations also 
caused – according to experts of the International 
Labour Organization39 – by endemic corruption 
of judicial institutions and government that has 
fueled a general distrust towards the regulation 
of contractual business relationships and work. 
However, since the early years of the nineteenth 
century, Cambodia has become one of the lea-
ding nations in which Western companies of the 
textile sector invest, because, it is not part of the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and there are no 
limitations on the amount of cotton that can be 
exported to Western markets (such as for China, 
Indonesia, Thailand and others).
With the increase in production volume, 
however, the problem of conflict in the workplace 
does not disappear. On the contrary, in the years 
following the signing of the US-Cambodia bila-
teral trade agreement the number of industrial 
disputes reached the maximum level40. The need 
39  See, H. van NOORD, H. S. HWANG, K. BUGE-
JA, Cambodia’s Arbitration Council: Institu-
tion-building in a developing country, in ILO 
Working Paper No.24, Geneva, august 2011, p. 2.
40  By the study of the ILO documents and the 
Reports of the Arbitration Council may be in-
ferred a direct relationship between the growth 
in the volume of business and number of col-
lective disputes: while the first passed by an 
amount of $ 26.5 million in 1995 to $ 2.8 billion 
in 2007, the latter, from 17 to 80 during the same 
period. See H. van NOORD, HS HWANG, K. 
BUGEJA, Cambodia’s Arbitration Council: In-
stitution-building in a Developing Country, cit., 
p. 3 and The Arbitration Council Annual Report 
2011, p. 4, available, as the following and subse-
quent reports, at: http://www.arbitrationcoun-
cil.org/en/media/publications/annual-reports
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to bring the contrast inside the legal procedures 
and mutual recognition between the social par-
ties – that is essential to engage in any form of ne-
gotiation – are the basis of the current features of 
the Arbitration Council. Its functions are set out 
in Article 310 and following of the Cambodian 
Labor Code, within the regulation of individual 
and collective labor disputes (Chapter XII) and 
of collective industrial action (Chapter XIII). The 
criteria for selection and training of the judging 
panel members, along with all aspects of the pro-
cedure and the issuance of the arbitration award, 
are subject to the regulation of Prakas 99 of 21 
April 2004, issued by the Ministry of Labor41.
The analysis of the legislation relating to 
the capabilities of the AC and the time of the ar-
bitration procedure allows us to make an initial 
framework that highlights the unique character 
of this organism. First, despite the establishment 
of the Arbitration Council originated from a 
cotton trade treaty, its functions of judgment are 
not limited to this area, but have been extended, 
since the beginning, to all collective disputes re-
gardless of the productive sector within which 
have arisen. Even more significant, however, is 
the wording of the second subparagraph of Arti-
cle 312 which establishes the authority to decide 
not only disputes concerning trade union rights 
deriving from Cambodian and international law, 
but also “other disputes”, i.e. those disputes from 
which collective benefits could potentially arise 
for one or other of the parties to the conflict42. 
The allocation of a decisive role in the control of 
labor relations, moreover, is reinforced by the 
provisions of Article 34 of Prakas, which gives to 
the Arbitration Panel “full powers of interven-
tion” in the controversy. The latter is required 
to take appropriate action in order to stop vio-
lations of the rules and the negative effects that 
are derived: in particular, the AC may ask the re-
paration of the damages suffered by the parties, 
included the reinstatement of unfairly dismissed 
41  In the Cambodian legal system, the Prakas is a 
sublegislative source of law and one or more mi-
nisters jointly are competent for the emanation. 
Normally the Prakas contains provisions that 
specify the content of laws and therefore plays 
a vital role in addressing the choice of the court, 
especially in a country where the judicial class 
has not developed a “culture of independence” 
from political power.
42  “The Council of Arbitration legally decides on 
disputes concerning the interpretation and en-
forcement of laws or regulations or of a collec-
tive agreement. The Council’s decisions are in 
equity for all other disputes”. 
employees (point A) and the interruption of on-
going collective action (point C)43.
The capacity to perform an effective task 
in litigation has undoubtedly helped to increase 
the credibility of the AC, paving the way to its 
settlement in the difficult context of Cambodia’s 
industrial relations. It should be noted, however, 
that also other components of this experience of 
institution-building proved decisive for this pur-
pose. Firstly, it was crucial that the path of the 
Labor Dispute Resolution Project was not limited 
to the establishment of a judicial body, but took 
into account the problem of the effective start-up 
and the range of its activities. For this purpose, in 
order to overcome the initial distrust of unions 
and employers, the legislative framework has es-
tablished that the parties – before the judgment 
– can also choose not to be bound by the outco-
me of the arbitration proceedings. If within ei-
ght days from the notification of the Arbitration 
Panel’s decision one of the parties notifies the 
Ministry its intention to file the opposition, the 
dispute would start a new course under the State 
justice (Article 313). A second feature of the arbi-
tration process that has helped to make the AC 
“familiar” to the social partners is the free access, 
sanctioned at legislative range by Article 316 of 
the Labor Code.
The establishment of an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution body for collective disputes has been 
accompanied from the outset by the search for 
legitimacy, which, in a country where develop-
ment has led to strong social polarization, could 
not be irrespective of themes such as the volun-
tariness of jurisdiction and the democratization 
of access to justice. These two components, ho-
wever, do not seem to be enough to disprove the 
economicist structure of the institution-building 
operation, which emerges clearly in front of many 
more aspects of the arbitration procedure. The 
rapidity of the procedure is certainly one of the 
most significant: Article 313 of the Labor Code 
imposes a burden on the Panel to issue its de-
cision within 15 days. It is not disputed that the 
43  Art. 34, Prakas no. 99: “In matters referred to 
the arbitration panel, the panel shall have the po-
wer and authority to fully remedy any violation 
of provisions provided in the Labour Law, imple-
menting regulations under the Labour Law, col-
lective bargaining agreements or other obliga-
tions arising from the professional relationship 
between employer and employee. Within the 
limitations of the Labour Law and this Prakas, it 
has the power and authority to provide any civil 
remedy or relief which it deems just and fair [...]”
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brevity of this term contrasts strongly with the 
formulations that give full investigative powers to 
the arbitrators about the workplace conditions or 
that require them to examine all the documents 
brought by the counterparties in support of their 
demands44. 
The “problem-solving approach”, which de-
notes the entire operation of transplant, is not 
clear only with regard of the delimitation of the 
judicial area – as has already stated above – but 
also with regard to the objectives. Therefore, if fif-
teen days are a clearly too short a period of time 
to “do justice”, it is not a coincidence that the le-
gislative provisions requiring the Panel to exami-
ne only the issues that have led to the failure of 
previous attempts of conciliation45 and to seek, 
before opening the judgment, a new basis for a 
mutual agreement between the parties. Further 
confirmation of this reading can be traced in the 
annual-reports in which the Arbitration Council 
takes stock of its activities and their future deve-
lopments: the insistence with which the statistics 
relating to the increase in cases submitted to the 
AC are contrasted with a substantial decrease of 
strikes aimed primarily to demonstrates a com-
mitment to the pacification of industrial rela-
tions46. This ideal of labor justice has never been 
questioned by the promoters of the two interna-
tional projects that have given financial support 
to the activity of AC (Labor Dispute Resolution 
Project, directed by the ILO, until 2009, and De-
mand for Good Governance Project, directed by 
the World Bank, which was completed in March 
2014). In contrast, the model of the Cambodian 
44  Article 312, par. 3 e 4, of Labor Code: “The Cou-
ncil of Arbitration has a broad power to inves-
tigate the economic situation of the enterprises 
and the social situation of the workers involved 
in the dispute.
 The Council has the power to make all inqui-
ries into the enterprises or the professional or-
ganizations, as well as the power to require the 
parties to present any document or economic, 
accounting, statistical, financial, or adminis-
trative information that would be useful in ac-
complishing its mission. The Council may also 
solicit the assistance of experts”. 
45  Article 312, par. 1, of Labor Code: “The Coun-
cil of Arbitration has no duty to examine issues 
other than those specified in the non-concilia-
tion report or matters, which arise from events 
subsequent to the report, that are the direct con-
sequence of the current dispute”. 
46  As recorded by the Annual Report 2011, p. 4: “As 
at the end of 2011, the correlation between the 
lowest strike record in the garment industry and 
the highest number of labour disputes received 
by AC suggests maturing of industrial relations 
in the Cambodian garment sector” 
arbitration tribunal is sponsored by the Legal Vice 
Presidency of the World Bank, “[as] an example 
of the application of an iterative, problem-solving 
approach to justice reform”47.
6. Strengthening the Founda-
tions through Social-Issues 
Monopolization: the new 
Procedural Rules and the 
generalization of AC Juris-
diction.
It is necessary add to the description above 
the important turning point marked by the sig-
ning of the Memorandum of Understanding on Im-
proving Industrial Relations in the Garment Indus-
try (MoU) on 28 September 2010. The agreement, 
signed by some of the most representative unions 
of the country, has been promoted by Internatio-
nal Labor Organization and by World Bank in or-
der to ensure greater predictability of results in the 
application of legislative provisions and to encou-
rage dialogue between the social parties, especially 
in the mean of arbitration proceedings48.
The signatories expressly recognize the im-
portance of a conciliatory approach to the dispute 
in order to ensure an improvement in working 
conditions and to prevent unlawful conduct by 
the employees or the employers49. Significant are 
the provisions on negotiations at the enterpri-
se level. In particular, it has been stated that no 
association of workers may give rise to strikes 
against the agreement reached as a result of the 
conciliation procedure in front of the AC when it 
has been signed by the most representative trade 
unions in the workplace50. 
47  See, New Directions on Justice Reform, cit., p. 9.
48  The text of the agreement, translated into En-
glish, is available on the ILO webesite: http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/--
-ro-bangkok/---ilo-phnom_penh/documents/
genericdocument/wcms_145234.pdf
49  See point 2 of the Memorandum of Understan-
ding: “Both parties support CBA [Council Bilat-
eral Agreements] in order to achieve certainty 
and predictability and to protect rights and 
terms of work condition for both parties”. 
50  See point 3 of the Memorandum of Understan-
ding: “Both parties support the MRS [Most Rep-
resentative Status] as the exclusive bargaining 
agent on behalf of all workers in the enterprise. 
Minority unions can participate in the process 
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The statements that have most contributed 
to increasing centrality of the Arbitration Coun-
cil in the Cambodian industrial system, however, 
are those contained in points 5 and 6 of the MoU. 
The former establish the compulsory nature of 
any conciliation agreement reached in front of 
the Panel and the latter is recognized as the ex-
clusive judicial body for any disputes which arise 
about its implementation. Therefore, a “Council 
Bilateral Agreement” has a general effect inside 
the workplace and the parties are bound to im-
plement any relevant decision from the Panel. 
Point 6 repeats the same commitment towards all 
the future controversies that would arise between 
the signatory parties, regardless of the existence 
of any prior conciliatory agreement. This provi-
sion, de facto, introduces a binding arbitration 
for most of the collective labor disputes that will 
arise in Cambodia by refraining the parties from 
any appeal to the State courts51.
Ref lecting on the potential consequences 
of the latter provision, perhaps even more than 
the formers, it is clear that main objective of the 
MoU is to guarantee that the benefits related to 
the rapidity of the arbitration (i.e. the smooth 
continuation of the production, the continuity of 
company’s profits and employment contracts) are 
not compromised by the opening of a trial. Con-
sequently, it seems to be clear a subordination of 
the objective of “good governance” and guaran-
teeing social rights – pursued by the internatio-
nal projects that have given support to the reform 
of justice – to the main interest for the industrial 
growth of the country. A relief that is not even 
mitigated by the AC, for which the assurance of 
a decision within 15 days is a transversal advan-
tage, therefore, is not limited to one party of the 
conflict: “[...] This speedy standard of AC dispute 
resolution enables both enterprises and their wor-
kers to focus on the productivity and income”52.
It is appropriate to consider part of this fra-
mework even the provisions that seem to introdu-
ce elements of eminently-legal rationality in the 
experience of institution-building in Cambodia. 
Thus, for example, the provisions of the Prakas 
by choice but along with all employees must res-
pect the authority of the MRS union, and have 
no right to initiate or disrupt bargaining or to 
object to any CBA reached by MRS union”
51  At point 6 of Memorandum it is settled, in fact: 
“[...] Where an arbitration decision on dispute 
of rights is given, the employer and workers and 
their representatives accept that the decision is 
final and binding on them.[...]”
52 See Arbitrarion Council Annual Report 2011, p.7. 
99/2004 requiring the arbitrators to indicate the 
edicts of the law or the collective agreement whi-
ch form the basis its decision (Article 38)53 do not 
seem to play a substantial role in the spread of the 
rule of law in the face of the conciliatory and eco-
nomist tendency of the procedure within the AC. 
These considerations can be repeated also in 
the light of the subsequent AC Procedural Rules 
adopted pursuant to Article 31 of the Prakas by 
the Ministry of Labor on the advice of the Arbi-
tration Council itself. These are divided into se-
ven “Rules”, each of which is in turn divided into 
subsections: they shows no trace of formulations 
that engage the arbitrators to ensure the predic-
tability of contractual effects or certainty of fun-
damental rights, whereas particular attention is 
paid to the outcome of the procedure and to redu-
ce costs. With regard to the first profile, is establi-
shed that in carrying out their activities arbitra-
tors are required to conform to considerations of 
“fairness”54 and, in approaching the study of the 
dispute, they must take into account that recon-
ciliation “is always the desirable option”55. The 
second profile is the most mentioned objective in 
the Procedural Rules and is consistently associa-
ted in the text with the need to reach a rapid de-
cision56. For this purpose, in order to ensure the 
effective short time limits for the composition of 
the Panel and the proper constitution of the party 
to the proceedings, is encourage the use of the te-
lephone communication as legal notification57.
A further level of guarantees, aimed at stren-
gthening the judicial vocation of the Arbitration 
Council, is detectable in the context of the provi-
53  The importance of this prediction can be gras-
ped if we consider that the Cambodian courts 
traditionally do not usually justify their judg-
ments in law. See, in this regard, H. van NOORD, 
HS HWANG, K. BUGEJA, Cambodia’s Arbitra-
tion Council: Institution-building in a Developing 
Country, cit., P. 12.
54  Rule 4.8.
55  Rule 4.10:” Settlement through conciliation is 
always the desirable option and the parties at all 
times retain the right to settle on their own terms 
including during the course of the arbitration”. 
56  Rule 4.9: “Postponements of arbitration hea-
rings are costly and undesirable. Postpone-
ments will only be granted by the arbitration 
panel where all parties to the arbitration agree 
such postponement”.
57  See Rule 6.3: “Because time is of the essence in 
the conduct of proceedings of the Arbitration 
Council, the use of telephone communications 
is encouraged among all persons involved, un-
less the Labour Law, the Prakas or these Rules 
specifically require written communication. In 
any case, proof of such communication may be 
required”.
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sions on the arbitrators appointment. The Article 
311 of the Labor Code stated that they “shall be 
chosen from among judges, members of the Ad-
visory Committee of Labor, and generally among 
prominent figures known for their moral quali-
ties and their competence in economic and social 
matters”. The appointment of the 15 arbitrators 
is formally accomplished by an act (Prakas) of 
the Ministry of Labour but the choice is accom-
plished one-third by the associations of workers, 
one-third by employer unions and one-third by 
the Ministry of Labor. Only the associations who 
are part of the Consultative Committee of Labor, 
however, take part in the elections. The reform 
introduced by Prakas 99/2004 has maintained 
the annual term of office (Article 2), but has ad-
ded the further requirement that each member 
must be renewed by the Minister unless preclude 
occurring reasons of health, criminal convictions 
or incompatibility (indicated in Article 7). The 
arbitrators, in fact, serve for life (“as they remain 
in good standing”58), and this certainly contribu-
tes to the formation of an expertise in the field 
of dispute resolution. The latter provisions find a 
positive acknowledgement in the last Report of 
the AC, which shows both a substantial increase 
in the disputes examined by the Panel (from 145 
cases in 2010 to 255 in 2012) and a high percenta-
ge of cases “successfully concluded”59.
Finally, it is worth considering data on the 
use of the “return-to-work orders”, with which the 
AC has the ability to impact on the effective en-
joyment of the rights enshrined at constitutional 
level60. Also on this side, the Report 2012 points 
out that only 16% of the ordinances did not find 
implementation while in the rest of the cases the 
production continued normally pending the con-
clusion of the arbitration proceedings. The less 
58  Cfr. H. van NOORD, H. S. HWANG, K. BUGE-
JA, Cambodia’s Arbitration Council: Institu-
tion-building in a developing country, cit., p. 25.
59  Disputes are considered “closed positively” 
when a settlement agreement has been reached 
before trial (34% of the disputes submitted) or 
where the arbitration decision had actually lead 
to the normalization of business relation (36% 
of cases). See The Arbitration Council Annual Re-
port 2012, p. 4.
60  Article 37 of the Constitution of the United 
Kingdom of Cambodia states that the right to 
strike and to demonstrate peacefully must be 
exercised within the limits defined by law. To 
this regard, Article 312 et seq. of the Labor Code 
dictate the general predictions regarding the 
strike, in which it is still considered illegal the 
strike accomplished when the arbitration proce-
dure has not been completed yet (Art. 320).
data reassuring – and on which the Arbitration 
Council, however, does not seem to express any 
concern – is that the number of orders for inter-
ruption of strike issued has more than tripled 
since the signing of the Memorandum of Unders-
tanding (from 14 in 2010 to 45 in 2012)61. This is 
an element that strengthens even more the con-
sideration of this institution-building experience 
as a highly-intrusive attempt to intervene in the 
system of social relations of the country.
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Direitos Fundamentais e a Migração de Modelos Judiciais  
na Condicionalidade dos Tratados Transnacionais de  
Investimentos e Políticas Públicas. O caso Cambojiano
Resumo
A reforma da justiça nos países em desenvolvimento é uma das prioridades mais importantes das 
organizações econômicas internacionais. Esse objetivo é frequentemente seguido pela criação de no-
vas instituições para além das autoridades nacionais a fim de impedir que estas interfiram em suas 
funções. Teorias que ligam o crescimento econômico e a normatividade de modelos jurídicos ofere-
cem legitimação às migrações legais necessárias para cumprir os padrões internacionais. O caso do 
Camboja, no entanto, destaca que esta ligação é, muitas vezes, desequilibrada e a regulamentação do 
novo modelo busca mais um incremento produtivo do que melhorar a Justiça no domínio dos Direitos 
Fundamentais.
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